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Abstract
Tax Increment Financing (TIF) is one of the most popular economic development tools in
use, as well as one of the few economic development tools available to municipal governments.
Although it was slow to be adopted by many states, currently every state, as well as the District
of Colombia, has active TIF districts to back over $35 billion in bonds across the country.
Despite its popularity, there is no consensus on the ability of TIF to create a planned and
measurable outcome. Because of this ambiguity, TIF usage is clustered across the country as
state legislatures have put in varying requirements to restrict the ability of local governments to
create districts. The purpose of this paper is to analyze current TIF usage by states across the
country, as well the different requirements each state has for local governments to create districts
and their effectiveness on limiting district creation. This study uses three linear regressions with
each requirement in use by multiple states as an independent variables being tested against the
total districts in each state, the total funding in each state backed by TIF revenue and the funding
per capita in each state backed by TIF revenue. Findings indicate that requirements that were
passed to limit TIF usage are not associated with decreased TIF usage. This study does find that
additional planning requirements for district creation may be overburdensome for local
governments. This study concludes that the requirements put in place by state legislatures may
not matter as much as how each law was written for its ability to limit district creation.

Introduction
Economic development is a highly competitive field where governments compete against
each other to be the home for large companies in the hopes of bringing jobs to citizens and tax
revenue for themselves. Traditionally, the recruitment of these industries involves rolling out the
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red carpet on recruitment trips and offering multi-million dollar incentive packages to businesses
in exchange for relocating to their city or state for the expansion of jobs and operations if the
firm is already located in the city. Ultimately, the goal of local economic development is not
solely about the number of jobs created or money invested, it is the opportunity to improve the
quality of life for their citizens. Cities want to ensure that their citizens can find jobs, make good
wages, and live happily. While the recruitment of industry continues to be the ideal economic
development process for local and state officials, Tax Increment Financing is a tool that is
popular across the country.
The pursuit of creating a higher quality of life can come at a high cost to local
governments who try to incentivize firms to come to their city. These incentives typically take
two different forms, either as a direct cost out of the city budget, such as buying and developing
land for an industrial park, general infrastructure improvements for firms, and workforce
development programs. Cities also pay indirectly for these programs in the form of tax and other
incentives. Both programs are aimed at assisting the firm as they attempt to maximize their profit
by locating in that city, as that is the goal assumed for every firm1.Unfortunately, most city
governments do not have the ability to offer significant incentives because of limits on the
amount of taxes they can impose as well as competition from cities in their region and across the
country.
Tax Increment Financing (TIF) is a tool used by local governments, either alone or in
coordination with state government, to help these firms maximize their profits. What makes TIF
an attractive program for local governments is twofold. First, TIF, if implemented properly, can
be revenue neutral for local governments. TIF works by collecting additional revenue from

1

Timothy J. Bartik, Local Economic Development Policies, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2004.
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increased property values over time. To do this, when cities create TIF districts they allocate the
same amount of property tax revenue, the base value, to the general budget every year for a
specified amount of time, and the additional tax revenue, or the tax increment, goes into a
separate fund to encourage development into the specified district. This works as long as the
assumption holds that the public investment will generate more revenue and public benefit than
cost2. Figure 1.1, shown below, illustrates how TIF works.3 As property values rise each year,
the amount over the base value is the tax increment that is used to pay for investments in each
district.
Figure 1.1

Property Values

TIF
Revenue
Tax Baseline
Time
Creation

Termination

Second, TIF encourages the cooperation of the private and public sector, leading to more
Public-Private Partnerships (P3s) and more efficient investments because of enhanced
communication. TIF works by allowing local governments to capture the future increases in
property value, or the tax increment, to pay for investments, most often in partnership with the
private sector. The important elements of TIF are that the investments take place in a designated

Bridget Fisher, Flavia Leite and Lina Moe, What is Tax Increment Financing (TIF)?, The Schwartz Center for
Economic Policy Analysis, June 9, 2020.
3
David Merriman, Improving Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for Economic Development, Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy, 2018.
2
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geographic district, over a defined duration period, with an expenditure for economic investment,
and expected real estate appreciation that will create higher property values 4.
Tax Increment Financing began in California in 1952 as a way for cities to raise matching
funds for federal grants to combat blighted properties. It was slow to spread. By 1970 only seven
states had passed legislation allowing TIF districts. However, more states allowed TIF districts
as local governments saw it as an economic development option beyond a tool to invest federal
funds and fight urban blight. It grew into a way to fund development projects without increasing
taxes, increasing the city’s debt limit, or requiring a vote. Today 49 states (all but Arizona) and
the District of Columbia allow the creation of new TIF districts, however, requirements for
creation vary greatly by state5.
TIF projects are similar to more common economic development practices. The
traditional way cities pay for infrastructure improvements, general obligation bonds (G.O.
Bonds), are traditionally cheaper than bonds purchased for TIF projects because they are fully
backed by the local government. Because of this, the revenues raised by TIF are not used for
large infrastructure projects. They are designed for specific projects that require financing
upfront, which is why it is regarded as a tool for coordination between the public and private
sector6.
Supporters of Tax Increment Financing view it as a way to allow cities to develop more
efficiently by increasing cooperation between the public and private sector, fixing budgeting
difficulties for cities attempting to undertake projects, and a way to allocate capital more

David Merriman, Improving Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for Economic Development, Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy, 2018.
5
Larry Marks, The Evolving Use of TIF, Review, Summer 2015.
6
Joseph Blocher and Johnathan Q. Morgan, Questions About Tax Increment Financing in North Carolina, University
of North Carolina School of Government, August 2008.
4
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efficiently. This comes from governments' cooperation with the private sector to find the specific
capital improvements that a firm needs or desires, allowing them to maximize their profit. This is
done in a self-funding way as long as the TIF district is planned correctly. This self-funding
ability is key to city governments that struggle to balance their operational budget, allowing them
to assist in economic development without cutting services that their citizens rely on.
Opponents of TIF view it as another way for the government to subsidize corporations.
They view the capital expenditures as unnecessary; if they were worth the cost then the
corporations would pay for them themselves. More vocal critics take these claims a step further,
arguing that the lack of oversight by most states allows TIF to be subject to corruption. Another
common criticism is how TIF can take money away from other local governments because they
only get to collect property taxes at the established level, meaning they do not get to collect extra
revenue as property values go up. Lastly, there is the argument that TIF does not generate
economic growth by itself, instead, it simply moves growth from one area of a city to the
designated TIF district7.

Literature Review
Research on TIF has produced reports that show mixed results of Tax Increment
Financing. Some show positive outcomes in economic development factors such as job growth
and increased tax revenue, others show negative effects for the same indicators. Most papers
conclude that the impacts of TIF are inconclusive or mixed8.

Dave Swenson and Liesl Eathington, "Tax Increment Financing Growth in Iowa" (2006). Economics Technical
Reports and White Papers. 25
8
Komla Dzigbede and Rahul Patrick, “Tax Increment Financing and Economic development” Brookings Institution.
7
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Perhaps the most expansive piece of research on TIF comes from the Lincoln Institute
of Land Policy, by David Merriman (2018), Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for Economic
Development. Dr. Merriman explores the history of TIF, some of the most famous examples of
TIF districts, and reviews the successes and failures of TIF. When reviewing the successes and
failures of TIF Dr. Merriman points out the difficulty in evaluating TIF because the variations of
laws and regulations differ greatly from state to state9.
Another review of Tax Increment Financing was done by Hakyeon Lee (2020) in his
Essays on Economic Development Policies. In his paper he explores the argument that TIF has
become a zero-sum development practice, showing that individual Tax Increment Financing
districts are not the only areas that receive the benefits, and it could be shared with nearby
districts. Because of this, he justifies the intervention for upper levels of government, such as
states, to ensure economic development is taking place in an organized and planned matter 10.
Professors Dave Swenson and Liesl Eathington (2006) of the Iowa State University
Economics Department reviewed the effectiveness of TIF districts in the state of Iowa. This
study is important because as they claim in their paper “It is widely considered by researchers
studying this topic that Iowa has one of the most lenient and lucrative statutes for TIF usage in
the U.S.” Also, at the time of this study Iowa was experiencing extreme growth in the number of
TIF districts in the state, from 746 districts in 1991 to 1,014 districts in 1997, and 2,238 districts
in 2006. Their evaluation of the success of TIF is inconclusive. The majority of tax revenue
growth is concentrated in the larger cities of the state, indicating that TIF has been successful.
Smaller cities and rural areas have not had as much success raising revenue, with evidence

David Merriman, Improving Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for Economic Development, Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy, 2018.
10
Hakyeon Lee, Essays on Economic Development Policies, The University of Kentucky, 2020.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/msppa_etds/36/
9

8

saying that the revenues they did raise were captures from other local governments. There were
also signs that TIF districts did not create any new growth by themselves, instead, they only
moved growth from one area of the city to new areas of the city. Overall, the researchers were
hesitant to make any judgments on TIF districts in Iowa, but they did say that the average Iowa
city raised $2 in TIF receipts for every $1 spent11.
The Office of Community and Rural Affairs at Purdue University published a report in
December 2016 reviewing how TIF is being used in the state of Indiana. They found that Urban
centers have a higher quantity of TIF districts as well as increasing frequency compared to the
rural areas of the state. They attributed this to the difference in city quantity and population
between rural and urban areas, as well as rural areas having fewer non-agricultural industries and
employment, which are the typical target of TIF expenditures. Overall, in 2015 7.3% of assessed
net assets in Indiana were assessed TIF values, showing how extensive TIF usage is in the
state12.
Overall, the research into Tax Increment Financing is very specific, focused on the results
from individual districts or cities. There has not been any study into how TIF affects the nation
on a more macro level. This is partially due to the nature of TIF, as it has a specified goal within
a well-defined geographic boundary. However, TIF’s ability or inability to create an economic
benefit has not been studied outside of a local or statewide level.

Dave Swenson and Liesl Eathington, "Tax Increment Financing Growth in Iowa" (2006). Economics Technical
Reports and White Papers. 25
12
Larry DeBoer, “The Use of Tax Increment Financing by Local Iowa Governments,” Office of Community and Rural
Affairs at Perdue University, December 2016.
11
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Question
This paper is not about the efficacy of Tax Increment Financing on local economic
development, unlike the previous studies. The focus of this paper is on the availability of TIF to
be used by local jurisdictions and if different requirements for the creation of TIF districts by
states impact TIF availability. The basic principles of TIF operation are consistent across districts
but the ability of local governments to create TIF districts is not. It is up to the legislature of each
state to set the conditions for TIF districts to be established with differing levels of oversight by
each state13. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the different requirements by states that
affect the total number of TIF districts in each state, the total borrowing in each state that is
backed by TIF revenue and the borrowing per capita of each state that is back by TIF revenue.
Daphne Kenyon, Adam H. Langley and Bethany P. Paquin (2012) reviewed the different
state requirements to create Tax Increment Financing District in a report reviewing property tax
incentives for the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. They identified the presence of blight, a “but
for” test, a feasibility study, a cost-benefit analysis, a project to be consistent with the local
government’s comprehensive or development plan, a project plan, a finding of public benefit, a
finding of development potential and “other” requirements as the most common by states 14. This
report was updated by David Merriman (2018) who included the estimated number of Tax
Increment Financing Districts per state in a policy focus report as a part of the Lincoln Institute
of Land Policy. Merriman found that the most common requirements for district creation were
the same as they were in 2012.

David Merriman, Improving Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for Economic Development, Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy, 2018.
14
Daphne Kenyon, Adam Langley, Bethany Paquin, Rethink Property Tax Incentives, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy,
2012.
13
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Analysis of Requirements
The presence of blight is the most common requirement, required by 34 states This is the
most common requirement by states because the goal of TIF is to create economic growth or
shift existing growth from one area of the city to another. Requiring the presence of blight is a
way for states to ensure that growth is happening in a more equitable and targeted way. The
presence of blight also offers a higher probability that property values will appreciate as more
dilapidated properties will have a higher potential to grow15.
The second most popular requirement for Tax Increment Financing District creation is for
local governments to conduct a “but for” test. This is currently required by 17 states. A “but for”
test is a requirement where the local government must find that in their opinion, backed up by
research, that development in the proposed TIF district would not happen but for the use of TIF.
Typically, the purpose of this test is to prevent the excessive use of TIF and to protect
overlapping governmental units, as TIF diverts revenue away from those units. Typically to
satisfy this requirement local governments must prove that developments would not happen
solely through private investment in the reasonably foreseeable future and the induced
development will yield a net increase in market value compared to what would happen without
the presence of TIF in their own opinion16.
A feasibility study is almost as popular as a “but for” test, currently required by 17 states.
As defined by the Illinois legislature a feasibility study is a “preliminary report to assist a
municipality to determine whether or not tax increment allocation financing is appropriate for the
effective redevelopment of a proposed redevelopment project area.” These feasibility studies are

Missouri Department of Economic Development, Local Incentive Programs,
https://ded.mo.gov/community/local-programs#LocalTIF
16
Minnesota Legislature, The But-For Test. https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/issinfo/tif/butfor.aspx
15
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often defined in very broad ways that do not have strict requirements for local municipalities to
study. Typically included is the ability for TIF to support existing businesses, recruit and attract
new businesses, community interest including greenspaces, public gathering spaces and
enhanced aesthetics, bond financing cost, expected revenue and other factors that the local
municipality decides is relevant to study the feasibility of a TIF district 17.
A cost-benefit analysis is the only other requirement that is required by over ten states.
The cost-benefit analysis that is required by states is not just the typical quantitative analysis that
is conducted to compare the relevant costs and benefits of projects used across a variety of fields.
While this is included and required by certain states, there is also an emphasis on the qualitative
impacts that are hard to quantify in traditional cost-benefit analysis. For example, the state of
Nebraska requires a local jurisdiction to fill out a questionnaire as an attachment with each costbenefit analysis that can be answered in a strictly qualitative way18. As explained by the
Nebraska Unicameral Legislature (2020), a cost-benefit analysis should analyze tax shifts
resulting from the division of taxes, public infrastructure and community public service needs
impact and local tax impacts, impacts on employers and employees of firms locating or
expanding within the boundaries of the area, impacts on the student populations of school
districts within the city, any other impacts determined by the authority to be relevant to the
consideration of costs and benefits arising from the redevelopment project19.

Illinois General Assembly, Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act,
https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?DocName=006500050HArt%2E+11+Div%2E+74%2E4&ActID=802&C
hapterID=14&SeqStart=213100000&SeqEnd=215400000
18
City of Omaha, Nebraska, Howard TIF Redevelopment Project Plan Cost-Benefit Analysis- From the TIF
Application. https://planninghcd.cityofomaha.org/images/TIF_Documents/2019_CBA/14_Howard.pdf
19
Nebraska Legislature, Nebraska Revised Statute 18-2113.
https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=18-2113
17
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Another requirement that is not common is for projects backed by TIF revenue to be
consistent with the certified comprehensive or development plan for the local jurisdiction. It is
not required for local municipalities to include TIF districts specifically in their comprehensive
plan, but instead the use of lands in a TIF district to be consistent with the comprehensive plan 20.
Comprehensive plans are local governments’ guide to community, physical, social and economic
development. Included in these plans are land use analysis as well as projections for future land
use, with which projects backed by TIF revenue must comply in four states.
Required by three states is for local municipalities to conduct and publish a project plan
before tax increment funds can be spent. A project plan is a more specific version of a capital
improvement plan. It is required to make sure the costs of the public projects are paid within a
reasonable extent of the proposed TIF district’s remaining life and to protect the public interest
in relation to reimbursement for the cost of public infrastructure21.
In an effort to combat TIF overuse, four states require a finding of public benefit before
they can create a TIF district. This is not a standalone requirement, but instead a finding through
a feasibility test or a cost-benefit analysis. This is a very vague finding as there is not any
specific level of benefit but instead that a proposed TIF district will bring benefits to the public at
the local jurisdictional level22. Very similar is the requirement for a TIF project to have
development potential. This is required by three states to ensure that public funding is used for
projects that will lead to increased revenue eventually.

The Delaware Code, Title 22 Chapter 17. Municipal Tax Increment Financing Act.
https://law.justia.com/codes/delaware/2019/title-9/chapter-54/section-5415/
21
Wisconsin State Legislature, Chapter 60 Statues. https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/60/IV/23/32
22
Vermont Legislative Joint Fiscal Office, An Examination of the State of Vermont Tax Increment Financing
Program, January 2018. https://ljfo.vermont.gov/assets/docs/reports/79f1f110da/Final-TIF-Report-January-242018.pdf
20
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Twelve states have other requirements. Most of the other requirements are related to the
need for funds to be spent on infrastructure (Georgia, Montana and Virginia), additional planning
(California, Illinois and Maryland), or revenue requirements (Maryland and New Mexico).

Summary of Tax Increment Usage
There was an estimated 15,694 TIF districts across the United States in 201823. About
65% of all districts are located in just six states, Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio, Texas, Minnesota and
Iowa. Iowa contains the most TIF districts by a considerable margin, 3,340 compared to the next
closest state, Minnesota, which has 1,719 districts. The American Midwest is the region that has
adopted the use of TIF the most, as Texas, Pennsylvania, Maine, Florida, California, and
Colorado are the only states in the nation that have over 100 districts and are not located in the
Midwest. When the population is taken into account the Midwest continues to be the most
popular location for TIF districts. The states with the most TIF districts per capita include Iowa,
Nebraska, Maine, Minnesota and Wisconsin. Iowa contained the most TIF districts per capita by
far, with over one TIF district per 1,000 individuals. Nebraska is the next closest state with one
district for every 2,300 individuals.
Twelve states have less than 10 TIF districts, not including Arizona, which is the only
state that does not allow for the creation of Tax Increment Financing Districts. Delaware and
Hawaii do not have any TIF districts in their states, while Alaska only has one. The Northeast
and Southeast are the regions with the most conservative TIF states. In the Northeast, Delaware,
Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont all have less than 10

Daphne Kenyon, Adam Langley, Bethany Paquin, Rethinking Property Tax Incentives for Business, Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy, 2012. https://staging.community-wealth.org/sites/clone.communitywealth.org/files/downloads/paper-kenyon-et-al.pdf
23
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districts. In the Southeast, Virginia, North Carolina, Louisiana, and Arkansas have less than 10
TIF districts. Alaska is the only other state with less than ten districts. Even when the population
is taken into account, the Northeast and Southeast continue to be the most conservative TIF
users. The bottom ten states with TIF users per capita that have districts include Alaska,
Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New York, South
Carolina and Virginia.
There is more variety of total funding backed by TIF by state. California, Colorado,
Illinois, Minnesota and Missouri. California has invested the most money into TIF districts, with
a total of $25 billion from 2000-2014. Colorado has the second-most, with $1.5 billion over the
same period. California also has the most amount of dollars invested per district, with an average
of $33 million. However, this is very close to Connecticut and Kansas, with $32 million invested
per district. This is almost over double the next closest state, Colorado which invests an average
of $11 million per district. Even when the population is taken into account, California is still the
state with the highest rate of investment per capita with a million dollars invested for every 1,587
individuals. Colorado has the second-highest investment per capita with a million dollars
invested per 3,703 individuals.
Eleven states have invested less than one million dollars in TIF districts between 2000
and 2014. Of those 11, five have more than 10 TIF districts which are Wyoming, Washington,
New Mexico, New Jersey and New Hampshire. Of the states that have invested at least one
million dollars, Ohio has the lowest funder per district at just $40,000 per district. Kentucky,
Nebraska, Iowa, South Dakota, Wisconsin and Maine all have investments of less than $100,000
per district. The state that has the least amount of TIF funding per capita is North Carolina who
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invests $1,000 for every 1,000 residents. Tennessee, Virginia, Maryland, Louisiana and Hawaii
all have invested less than $10,000 per 1,000 residents.

Analysis
The design for my research will be three linear regressions. Each is focused on how the
common state requirements affect the number of Tax Increment Financing districts, the total
borrowing from 2000-2014 from TIF district and the borrowing back by TIF revenue per capita.
These variables were chosen because they are the most likely to define the impact of TIF for
each state. The number of districts is important because it potentially shows the number of
projects and thus the scope of TIF in that state. However, the amount of financing in each state
also tells an important story as well because it is a measure of the effort to jump-start economic
development in districts. The funding per capita is an important measure to analyze more evenly
how different state requirements affect the TIF borrowing for each state.
The results from these tests will be used to see if there is a causal connection between the
different requirements of each state and the use of TIF in each state. This will help answer the
question of why the amount of TIF districts vary widely between states, as well as lead to a
better understanding of how state requirements, some of which are designed to limit district
overuse, impact the number of districts in each state. The total amount of districts does not tell
the full impact of TIF or address all the concerns. The amount of funding tells a more impactful
story because it is more comprehensive. Depending on each jurisdiction, they could create one
district for a variety of projects or a district for each project if the borders do not overlap. The
funding does not change based on the number of districts, just the number of projects. States will
attempt to limit the total funding as well as the number of TIF districts if they want to prevent
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TIF overuse. The study of funding per capita is important to show how more of the smaller states
limit funding.
The output variables will be scaled to account for other factors. The total number of TIF
districts will be scaled by the total square miles in each state to account for states size and the
total funding backed by TIF revenue will be backed by the total size of each sates’ budget. In
particular, there is a large correlation between the total TIF back funding in each state and state
budget size at 74%.
The following equations will be used to estimate TIF usage across the country, by state.
Y1 is the total number of TIF districts in each state scaled for the total square miles in each state,
Y2 is the total funding in each state backed by TIF revenue scaled for the states total budget and
Y3 is the total funding per capita in each state backed by TIF revenue.
Y1=β1Blight+β2ButFor+β3Feasability+β4CostBenefit+β5CompPlan+β6ProjectPlan+β7PotBenefits
+β8DevPotential+β9Population+ε
Y2=β1Blight+β2ButFor+β3Feasability+β4CostBenefit+β5CompPlan+β6ProjectPlan+β7PotBenefits
+β8DevPotential+β9Population+ε
Y3=β1Blight+β2ButFor+β3Feasability+β4CostBenefit+β5CompPlan+β6ProjectPlan+β7PotBenefits
+β8DevPotential+β9Population+ε
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Table 1: Regression of the number of TIF districts per sq. mile on various requirements
and population
Sample size: 49, overall r square: .166, F-test of the regression: 1.61
Independent variable

coefficient

std error

t

p

Blight

.0026

.0024

1.11

0.274

But for

.0032

.0025

1.31

0.198

Feasibility study**

-.0043

.0021

-2.04

0.048**

Cost-Benefit

-.0007

.0023

-.029

0.774

Comprehensive plan*

-.0026

.0015

-1.7

0.097*

Project plan**

-.0073

.003

-2.35

0.024**

Potential benefits

-.0037

.0057

-0.64

0.523

Development potential

-.0023

.0068

-0.32

0.748

1.76

1.17

1.51

0.140

.0029

.0021

1.37

0.177

Population (1,000)
Constant

*=p<.1,**p<.05,***p<.01

When testing how the common state requirements affect the total number of TIF districts
in each state there are three that have statistical significance. One is the completion of a
feasibility study. Another is for each jurisdiction to pass a project plan for each district. The
project plan requirement has a strong effect, with states that require a project plan having .0073
districts/square miles less than those that do not. As local governments have limited resources to
either finance or write their own plan, requiring municipalities to write additional capital
improvement plans can be, perhaps intentionally, burdensome. Requiring a feasibility study,
intentionally or not, can be burdensome for local governments as states that require feasibility
studies have .0043 districts/square miles. These plans are not designed to limit the number of
districts in each state, instead, they are supposed to be guides for local governments throughout
the preliminary phase of district creation.
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As a control for size, there is a strong correlation between population and the number of
TIF districts in states. For every thousand individuals in each state, there is an estimated increase
of 1.76 TIF districts per square mile in that state.
It is important to note that requirements, such as the “but-for” test, that were created and
implemented to limit Tax Increment usage do not have a statistically significant impact on the
number of TIF districts in each state. This could be due to the very vague way these requirements
are written by state legislatures. In Minnesota, legislation states that to satisfy their “but-for”
requirement, the findings are up to the “the opinion” of the municipality. The “but-for” test is
only required for the first approval of the TIF plan. If there are changes to the TIF plan after the
initial approval, the local municipality does not have to redo the test even if the changes are
substantial, including changing the purposes for which the increment may be spent.

Table 2: Regression of the total amount of TIF backed borrowing in each state
scaled to each states total budget on various requirements and population.
Sample size: 49, overall r square: .347 , F-test of the regression: 1.15
Independent variable
Blight
But for
Feasibility study
Cost-benefit
Comprehensive plan
Project plan
Potential benefits
Development potential
Population (1,000)*
Constant

coefficient

std error
.0014
-.0011
-.0043
.0033
-.0053
.0153
-.0098
.0024
1.00
-259.4

t

p
.0043
0.32
0.747
.0046
-0.25
0.803
.0051
-0.84
0.404
.0071
0.47
0.637
.0062
-0.86
0.393
.0155
0.99
0.328
.0099
-0.99
0.328
.006
0.39
0.696
5.21
1.92
.062*
388.7
-0.67
0.506
*=p<.1,**p<.05,***p<.01
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When analyzing the total funding financed by TIF revenue there are no requirements that
are statistically significant. Instead, funding backed with TIF funds are more correlated with each
states total budget than the requirements that are passed by each state to create TIF districts.

Table 3: Regression of the total funding per capita on various requirements and
population
Sample size: 49, overall r square: .148, F-test of the regression: 1.66
Independent variable
Blight
But for
Feasibility
Cost-benefit
Comprehensive plan
Project plan
Potential benefits
Development potential
Population (1,000)
Constant

coefficient

std error
0.021
0.114
-.071
0.071
-0.024
.118
-0.038
-0.17
4.73
.023

t

p
0.03
0.71
0.482
0.031
0.36
0.716
.058
-1.21
0.23
0.085
0.84
0.405
0.029
-0.81
0.417
0.088
1.34
0.182
0.062
-0.6
0.547
0.27
-0.64
0.522
3.46
1.37
0.175
.018
1.31
0.195
*=p<.1,**p<.05,***p<.01

There are no statistically significant state requirements when they are compared to the
amount of Tax Increment backed funding per capita.

Policy Recommendations
State requirements and rules for Tax Increment Financing usage show that rules put in
place to limit TIF usage are not associated with reduced TIF usage. It is clear that it is not just
important what requirements are put in place by state legislatures, but how they are written.
When states, like Minnesota, put in rules like the but-if test to specifically limit TIF overuse but
leaves that decision up to the local jurisdiction it is not surprising that Minnesota would have one
of the highest numbers of TIF districts as local governments seek new ways to finance projects.

20

Blight is another example of a requirement that can vary between states. Kentucky, one of the
states with the least amount of TIF districts, requires that projects meet certain criteria in order to
ensure the area is blighted, specifically listing seven blight conditions and requiring at least two
conditions are met for the district to qualify24. Iowa, on the other hand, leaves the definition of
blight up to the local municipality that is evaluating their conditions25. These differences in
definitions are just as important as the requirement at all for allowing the usage or preventing the
overage usage of TIF by state legislatures.
It is concerning that planning requirements such as project plans and feasibility studies
are limiting factors for TIF usage. They were not designed to limit TIF usage, instead, they are
supposed to guide how the projects should take place through additional planning. The purpose
of a feasibility study is to be a preliminary report to help municipalities decide if TIF is a viable
option to pay for projects. Every municipality that considers creating a TIF district has a similar
study take place as they go through the creation process, however requiring a feasibility study
limits district creation. Project planning is also a requirement that limits the number of TIF
districts in each state. This could reflect the limited capacity of local governments to f inance a
capital improvement plan as project planning is undertaken by every municipality creating a TIF
district, regardless of state requirements. Requiring a project funded by TIF to be consistent with
the municipalities could also be a burdensome requirement showing the limited ability of local
governments to plan effectively.

Kentucky Economic Development Cabinet, Just the Facts: Tax Increment Financing (TIF), May 2019.
https://ced.ky.gov/kyedc/pdfs/tif_fact_sheet.pdf
25
Iowa Legislature, Chapter 403 Urban Renewal. https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ico/chapter/403.pdf
24

21

Conclusion
Tax Increment Financing is a very popular economic development tool and unique for its
ability to be initiated by local jurisdictions as a self-financing tool. Between 2000 and 2014 there
was an estimated $37.5 billion in bonds backed by TIF revenue in the 49 states that allow TIF
usage. In 2018 there was an estimated 15,694 active TIF districts across 49 states. This wide use
is directly reflective of local governments’ effort to expand their tax bases and encourage
economic development in specific areas, typically those that have suffered from past
disinvestment. When executed properly, TIF offers local governments the ability to finance
bonds with the expected increased revenue from the projects they are financing. It is this thought
process that has led so many local governments to create TIF districts as a way to increase
investment for needed capital projects.
As diverse and unique as the usage of Tax Increment Financing are the opinions and
research into the effectiveness of TIF districts to finance projects. Although the studies into
TIF’s ability to produce planned and desirable outcomes are numerous, it is difficult to reach a
definite conclusion because each study typically focuses on specific programs and
districts/regions. State legislatures have used this ambiguity to decide for themselves the amount
of TIF they will allow, leading to inconsistent usages from state to state. States in the Midwest
could allow more TIF usage than those in the Northeast simply because they believe in the
ability to use TIF financing to create planned and effective outcomes. Midwestern states could
use TIF more often because there has been a need to find new ways to finance capital projects
because of decreases in tax revenue due to the disproportionate loss of manufacturing jobs that
has led the region to be called the “rust belt.” Apart from that, there may be other, unknown
reason why the Midwest prefers to use TIF financing more than other regions.
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There are rules and requirements that are put in place by state legislatures to prevent the
overuse of Tax Increment Financing by local governments. However, as stated by David
Merriman (2018) “to data, there has been no published academic work explaining why local
governments in some states use TIF more extensively than others.” Outside of culture, the ease
of local governments to create a TIF district could anecdotally be one of the strongest reasons
why TIF usage is so inconsistent. Certain requirements are put into law to specifically prevent
TIF overuse. This paper has found that none of those rules actually lead to TIF overuse.
Additional requirements that were not designed, apparently, to limit TIF usage actually are
limiting factors. Requiring local governments to partake in additional planning and to rely on
their previous planning is the limiting factor for the number of TIF districts in each state. That
may be an intentional burden intended to limit the overuse of TIF.
States have also been unable to limit Tax Increment Financing backed funding with their
requirements for district creation and other planning requirements. This is not surprising
considering that these same requirements did not limit the number of districts in each state. Of
note is the requiring of additional planning does not lead to more funding.
There is mixed belief in the effectiveness of TIF. There are states that have a preference
to use TIF and believe in its ability to plan and execute economic growth. These states do have
rules for local municipalities to create districts but are often written in very broad ways that
allow for the municipalities themselves to decide if they should be created, reflecting a culture
that is more accepting of TIF. Other states have more specific requirements that require local
municipalities to meet more strict criteria. Required local municipal planning has an impact on
the amount of TIF districts as well as total funding. As the goal of TIF is to produce a planned
and measurable outcome, states need to reevaluate the planning capability of municipalities to
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ensure planning requirements are appropriately restrictive but permit municipalities to plan
projects appropriately to ensure TIF projects achieving their goal.
Regardless of causal interpretation, it is clear that some stated rules either cause more or
less TIF usage or are adopted in response to TIF usage. In either case, the rules adopted matter.
The overall evaluation of TIF requires both adoption and effect of policy, here the success of TIF
projects, considered in various literature, and the effect of TIF adoption rules.

Limitations
This study covers a short period of time, so the results could be limited by the
macroeconomic environment at that time. The period considered had relatively strong economic
growth.
The major limitation is the interpretation of causality. This study is meant to descriptive,
not causal. Rules may be adopted out of a sense that they are correct, then results follow, or rules
can be adopted to be restrictive or loose. The finding that funding per capita is not much
affected by rules suggests that the major effects are on the number of projects. Planning
requirements clearly can be adopted to discourage overuse. Alternatively, they can be intended
to focus on larger projects. In a longer-term study, the adoption of the rules over time could be
considered as well as the time path of TIF usage over time.
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